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tAbstract
This paper provides a new perspective by classifying active labor market programs
(ALMPs) depending on their objectives, relevance and cost-effectiveness during normal
times, a crisis and recovery. We distinguish ALMPs providing incentives for retaining
employment, incentives for creating employment, incentives for seeking and keeping a
job, incentives for human capital enhancement and improved labor market matching.
Reviewing evidence from the literature, we discuss especially indirect effects of various
interventions and their cost-effectiveness. The paper concludes by providing a systematic
overview of how, why, when and to what extent specific ALMPs are effective.
JEL classification: J08, J22, J23, J38, E24
Keywords: Active labor market programs; Short work; Subsidies; Training; Workfare;
Activation; Sanctions; Job search assistance; Intermediation; Counseling;
Cost- effectiveness1 Introduction
Heavily advocated by the OECD, ALMPs are of growing interest and relevance due to in-
creasing unemployment also for transition and developing countries. Governments have
been responding to the crisis through active labor market programs (ALMPs) like subsidiz-
ing employment and providing training and employment services. The job crisis may have
increased unemployment persistence, leading to longer unemployment spells, an increase
in long-term unemployment and subsequently to skill attrition–thereby, also having detri-
mental effects on future employment probability1. At the same time, tighter budget con-
straints highlight the relevance of evidence-based, cost-effective active labor market policy
making to support recoveries. This paper aims to bridge the gap between understanding
cost-effective ALMPs and boosting post-crisis recoveries. At the same time, as pointed out
by Cazes et al. (2009) and as witnessed by take-up rates of ALMPs, for example, in work
sharing arrangements2, time lags until policies can be operational need to be taken into ac-
count. Thus, this calls for an existing ready-to-implement policy strategy based on existing
evidence, which can be adapted to the respective position in the business cycle.
This paper provides a new policy perspective in classifying ALMPs in light of their rele-
vance and cost-effectiveness during normal times and recoveries to guide evidence-based
policy making. We will discuss in particular the indirect effects, including macroeco-
nomic and general equilibrium effects, as well as longer run effects determining the
cost-effectiveness. We will also address the challenges for design and implementation in2015 Brown and Koettl. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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programs and their evaluations across countries, the focus of this paper is rather to provide a
systematic overview of the cost-effectiveness of ALMPs. In assessing the cost-effectiveness of
ALMPs, we follow Heckman et al. (1999), asking whether ALMPs are effective for targeted
workers in line with their respective aims and whether they are cost-efficient from a macro-
economic perspective3. In doing so, we provide a strong focus on indirect and macroeco-
nomic effects.
We show that policies retaining employment like work sharing schemes can be ap-
plied in severe recessions for limited time periods. ALMPs creating employment per-
form much better in terms of cost-effectiveness and desirability by strengthening
outsiders’ position in the labor market, especially during recoveries, and by raising the
outflow out of unemployment, ultimately reducing labor market persistence. In-work
benefits and public works are very cost-inefficient in terms of raising employment, but
might be cost-efficient in reducing poverty and inequity. Policies readjusting distorted
employment incentives, such as activation and sanction measures, have proven to pro-
vide cost-effective results, especially during normal times.
While short-run evaluations of ALMPs have not conveyed a consistent message on the
cost-effectiveness, new longer-term evaluations clearly indicate cost-effectiveness from a
longer-term perspective. This contrast is especially highlighted for training programs; evi-
dence shows significantly positive long-run impacts. This is especially clear for on-the-job
training and those targeted at disadvantaged outsiders. ALMPs improving labor market
matching have an impact only in the short-run but are highly cost-effective.
Existing reviews and evaluations do not always take into account the full set of ef-
fects, including the longer-run effects which may only materialize many years after the
program4. All these are, though, essential to determine the cost-efficiency of ALMPs
and to understand why some programs work and others do not5.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present our
new perspective on ALMPs. Section 3 provides an overview of indirect effects of
ALMPs. Section 4 discusses the cost-effectiveness of the classified ALMPs based on
evaluations of programs, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Categories of ALMPs
We present a new perspective on ALMPs by classifying them depending on their main
objective. It is useful to distinguish five categories due to their distinct objectives as
well as their different cost-effectiveness and relevance in a crisis, its recovery and
“normal” times. Table 1 provides an overview of these five categories of ALMPs.
First, ALMPs that provide incentives for retaining existing employment consist of
financial incentives to employers to continue their current employment relationship
with workers and thereby aim to decrease outflow from employment. These measures
are generally adopted for a limited period of time, support employed workers and are
targeted at jobs at risk6. Most prominent measures are wage subsidies and reductions
in non-wage labor costs as well as short work schedules or work sharing, which have
been widely used in advanced economies during the crisis7. Short work schedules or
work sharing programs are more complex subsidy programs; they incentivize em-
ployers to reduce labor costs along the intensive margin in contrast to the extensive
margin while fully or partly reimbursing workers for hours not worked8. This category
Table 1 Relevant instruments, target groups, and intended effects of ALMPs
Target
area









Insiders Reduce outflow from
employment
Wage subsidies Retain labor market attachment
II. Provide Incentives for
creating employment
Outsiders Increase inflow into employment





III. Provide incentives for







Increase inflow into employment
by strengthening work incentives
Reduce outflow from
employment
Increase labor market attachment
Provide income support
Public works Outsiders Increase inflow into employment
by strengthening work incentives




Outsiders Increase inflow into employment
by strengthening work incentives
Sanctions






Increase inflow into employment









Outsiders Improve job search efficiency







Improve job search efficiency
Improve match quality
Increase inflow into employment
Counseling and
monitoring
Outsider Improve job search efficiency
Increase inflow into employment
Note: “Insiders” refer to those who are currently employed, “outsiders” to the unemployed, long-term unemployed,
discouraged, informal workers, and inactive.
Source: Authors.
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income security to employees.
ALMPs providing incentives for creating new employment consist of incentives to
private employers and workers to increase inflow into employment9. These measures
thereby support labor market outsiders—that is, unemployed, inactive, and informal
workers—and are often targeted at specific groups of unemployed workers such as long-
term-unemployed and disadvantaged workers with outdated skills. Here, subsidies are also
the most prominent measures, specifically wage and hiring subsidies directed at private
employers, reducing their labor costs (e.g., salary or social contribution costs) and, thus,
providing incentives to employ new workers10. But also self-employment or entrepreneur-
ship incentives which provide financial incentives and advisory services to unemployed
workers fall under this category. These ALMPs can be targeted at specific groups and
usually involve some screening of feasible business plans11.
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tives for seeking and keeping a job primarily address labor supply by increasing the
payoff from employment for workers12. These instruments provide incentives to work
to low-wage, unemployed, discouraged, and inactive workers but at the same time also
have an explicit and clear redistributive objective. Important instruments are again fi-
nancial transfers and subsidies, but these are specifically paid to the workers as an in-
come supplement in the form of, for example, in-work benefits13. Also public works,
which might seem partly misplaced in this category, pursue an explicit social safety net
goal due to their history of ineffectiveness in achieving intended effects. Specifically,
public works are increasingly being applied as workfare–the obligation to produce pub-
licly useful goods or services as a condition for the receipt of unemployment benefits
or social assistance. Thus, as activation instruments, they aim, together with the often
associated sanctions, to reduce the disincentives to search for jobs and work created by
passive labor market policies.
To raise the employability and productivity of workers, some ALMPs provide incentives
for human capital enhancement by upgrading workers’ skills. These fourth category
measures are widely used in Europe and either directly provide or finance14 labor market
training and retraining in classrooms covering basic job skills or specific vocational skills
as well as on-the job training15. These measures are targeted at unemployed and
employed workers at the same time taking into account labor demand requirements.
Improved labor market matching policies aim at raising the probability, efficiency and
quality of labor market matching by supporting job seekers and employers as well as by tak-
ing an intermediate and brokerage role to overcome informational deficiencies16. Among the
wide range of instruments, the main elements are job search assistance and employer inter-
mediation services; the former helps unemployed workers find a job through counseling and
support services, access to and provision of information on the labor market situation and
trends17. The latter identify employers’ needs and establish contacts with potential employers.
These services are offered either traditionally by public employment services or by private
agencies, which prefer higher-skilled workers18. Often the participation in these measures is
also a condition to continue qualifying for unemployment benefits or combined with sanc-
tions, thereby part of the rights and obligations package19.3 Effects of ALMPs
To assess in line with their respective objectives whether ALMPs benefit the targeted
workers as well as whether they are cost-effective and socially desirable from a macro-
economic viewpoint, it is crucial not only to evaluate the direct effects on employment,
unemployment and earnings. Also partly countervailing indirect and general equilib-
rium effects on wage bargaining, incentives of targeted and third party employers and
workers etc. need to be explicitly evaluated, since they contribute to a net employment
effect. Along the same line, implications for the government budget and the effects on
the composition of and dynamics between labor market states need to be taken into
account20. Furthermore, beyond mere impact effects, long-run effects of these policies
must be taken into account. Reviews by Martin and Grubb (2001), Calmfors et al.
(2001) and Kluve and Schmidt (2002) cleary show the lacking evidence on the relation-
ship between ALMPs and job durations.
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and earnings act via three mechanisms: (i) an improved matching process; (ii) increased
and enhanced labor supply; and (iii) increased labor demand. Since these are well
understood, we will focus on describing the indirect effects21.
The indirect deadweight effect lowers the cost-effectiveness of ALMPs. It refers to
the resources of the policy that go to beneficiaries who would have achieved the object-
ive of the policy even in its absence. For example, it reflects the amount of hiring sub-
sidies that are paid for hiring workers who would be hired even without the subsidy.
While not completely avoidable, it can be minimized by concrete targeting of workers,
for example those with the lowest exit rates out of unemployment.
The effectiveness of ALMPs can be further undermined by the cream-skimming ef-
fect, by which only workers with high employment probabilities are selected into the
program22. This is especially significant if caseworkers assign workers to ALMPs and
need to deliver a good reemployment rate of participants23.
The displacement effect in the labor market captures the fact that employment gener-
ated by ALMP might displace or crowd our regular employment, which lowers the effect-
iveness of the instrument24. For example, firms hire subsidized workers instead of hiring
unsubsidized workers, or unsubsidized employed workers are fired and replaced by subsi-
dized workers. In addition, the displacement effect also covers the fact that once the sub-
sidy expires, the formerly subsidized worker is fired. Brown et al. (2011) illustrate that this
effect can be reduced through effective targeting or tolerated if this enables long-term un-
employed workers to reenter employment, regain work-routine and skills on the job, im-
proving their longer-run employability. Often only additional jobs are subsidized, which
reduces take-up rates, in order to significantly reduce displacement effects25. Further-
more, Martin and Grubb (2001) argue that in the medium run, capital will adjust and,
thereby, the displacement effect is only relevant in the short run.
Another unintended effect of ALMPs is the substitution effect, by which incentives to
employers are generated to substitute one skill-class of workers for another one to do the
same jobs due to a change in the respective relative labor-costs. For example, low-wage sub-
sidies might create the incentive for firms to substitute medium-ability workers with low abil-
ity workers. In contrast to the other mentioned effects, this effect lacks empirical support in
the literature, which suggests that substitutability between different skill groups is small26.
The wage-effect reduces the effectiveness of policies and is defined as the resources
of the ALMP that go into wage increases and thereby do not create new employment.
For example, a subsidy reduces the firm’s labor costs, which increases the bargaining
surplus, of which the worker will capture her share27.
During ALMPs workers may have less time or be less inclined to search for a job.
The so-called locking-in effect (also called retention effect) refers to the lower prob-
ability of finding a job of ALMP participants compared to the unemployed who are not
in ALMPs28. Calmfors (1994) expands the locking-in effect by also including the nega-
tive effect on search behavior due to the prospect of participating in an ALMP, for ex-
ample, due to its attractiveness, its pay, or its lack of required geographical mobility.
Martin and Grubb (2001) point out that the locking-in effect is particularly strong if
participation is voluntary or if it is necessary to participate to qualify for continued re-
ceipt of unemployment benefits. This effect can be weakened by compulsory participa-
tion without additional pay on top of benefits or at a minimum wage, since workers
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monitoring of the job seeking behavior and job search assistance during participation
and avoiding targeting workers who recently became unemployed and thereby still have
high employment probabilities can limit the locking-in effect.
ALMPs may have negative effects on participants’ future employment probabilities
due to the participation in the program; if the measure is too tightly targeted at very
disadvantaged workers, they may be stigmatized. The stigmatizing effect signals low
productivity to employers and prevents them from hiring workers participating in
ALMPs29. Early evidence from Burtless (1985) on too tightly targeted wage subsidies
in the USA shows that due to stigmatization, ALMPs can have the contrary effect of
reducing reemployment probabilities.
Skill-acquisition incentives might be negatively affected by ALMPs, the consequences
of which only materialize in the medium-run. For example, the negative skill-acquisi-
tion effect can be illustrated by low-wage subsidies, which might create disincentives
for unskilled workers to gain further human capital, since the subsidy reduces the wage
differential between unskilled and skilled work31. Oskamp and Snower (2006) show that
positive short-run employment effects can be outweighed by the longer-run conse-
quences of this effect.
Subsidies targeted at unskilled workers may provide an incentive to switch from full
to a part-time employment in order to cash in the subsidy, but limiting the subsidy to
full-time positions potentially provides incentives for firms and workers to collude and
cheat the government to qualify for the subsidy due to asymmetric information32.
While the negative indirect effects can be substantial, ALMPs can also have positive
indirect effects:
The so-called competition effects highlight ALMPs’ role in strengthening outsiders’
position in the job market relative to insiders. According to the insider-outsider the-
ory, labor turnover costs, firing costs as well as hiring and training costs for new em-
ployees give insiders market power, which they use to their own advantage, for
example, to push up their own wages33. The competition effect strengthens outsiders’
position and, thus, exerts a downward pressure on wages in addition to a labor supply
effect, thus, raising employment34.
The prospect of participating in ALMPs might (in contrast to the locking-in effect) gener-
ate an ex-ante threat effect, which characterizes the increased incentives for unemployed
workers to search for a job. This is the case for activation policies where the payment of un-
employment benefits is conditional on the participation in workfare programs35.
Bringing unemployed workers back into work via ALMPs will increase their employ-
ment probabilities by the transition effect. This effect is strongest for long-term un-
employed workers, who during their unemployment suffer from skill attrition and loss of
work routine36. If, for example, subsidies enable these long-term unemployed workers to
transition back into employment, workers gather work habits and routines, and their hu-
man capital appreciates37. Once the subsidy expires, they are more valuable to the em-
ployer than originally, their retention rate is higher than their former hiring rate. Even if they
are fired at this point, the former long-term unemployed workers are now short-term un-
employed with an increased human capital and higher reemployment probabilities than
long-term unemployed workers38. As Heckman et al. (2002) point out, bringing workers into
employment can have longer run impacts on workers’ human capital and employment path.
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information on the productivity of workers. Due to informational asymmetries on
workers’ productivity, long-term unemployment, for instance, may signal low productivity
to firms. ALMPs can indirectly improve the matching on the labor market by enabling
firms to experience workers’ productivity, e.g., via subsidized employment39.
Last but not least, budget effects have to be taken into account when evaluating the
cost-effectiveness in line with policy makers’ concerns. Also here this involves indirect ef-
fects. On the one hand, ALMPs financed by increasing taxes decrease the payoff from em-
ployment and, thereby, provide disincentives to work and search effort for all workers40.
On the other hand, these measures might generate additional tax revenue by bringing
people into employment and generate savings in unemployment benefits and social as-
sistance, which can be used to finance these measures41.
The design of ALMPs is crucial for their effectiveness. Focused targeting of mea-
sures can reduce negative indirect effects and give rise to positive ones, but it has to
avoid stigmatizing workers and creating cost-intensive monitoring or bureaucraticc
procedures, thereby reducing employer take-up. US evidence from Burtless (1985) and
Katz (1998) shows that employer reporting requirements increase administrative costs
and significantly reduce take-up.
Calmfors (1994) also discusses at which point in the unemployment spell workers
should be targeted, since a later targeting reduces deadweight and locking-in effects,
while at the same time this implies stronger skill attrition and more discouragement on
part of the workers due to longer unemployment duration.
For a holistic approach, ALMPs must take into account the interactions, comple-
mentarities, and repercussions with other active and passive labor market pol-
icies42. Betcherman et al. (2004), Martin (2014) and Kuddo (2009) recommend a
combination of sticks and carrots to provide incentives to search for and accept
jobs, to provide employment incentives by making participation mandatory with
the threat of benefit sanctions, and point to evidence of higher effectiveness. In
contrast, many other studies, e.g., Calmfors et al. (2001), Martin and Grubb (2001),
Kluve and Schmidt (2002), Kluve et al. (1999), Kluve et al. (2008) and Sianesi
(2001, 2004), provide robust evidence that participation should not be used as an
incentive instrument to (re-) qualify for the receipt of unemployment benefits
since this would lead to costly churning effects and boost program sizes43. The
churning effect refers to the providing of incentives to workers who have little
interest in regular employment and only participate in ALMPs in order to gain en-
titlements for another round of unemployment benefits.
In the following, we will discuss the relevant effects for each category of ALMPs, review
evaluations of these policies to determine their effectiveness and assess their suitability as
an instrument during an economic crisis, the recovery from it as well as during the
normal business cycle.4 Effectiveness, evaluation and suitability of various ALMPs44
4.1 Incentives for retaining employment (Category I)
ALMPs providing incentives for retaining employment via subsidies to employers or work
sharing schemes that aim to support or increase labor demand and, thereby, prevent an
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these measures aim at preventing inefficient separations of workers who would have been
retained in the longer-run in the absence of a temporary reduction in demand. Furthermore,
the authors attribute to these measures the potential not only to raise efficiency but also
equity by more equally distributing the cost of the crisis among the workforce45. Nonetheless,
deadweight and substitution effects might be very substantial for these measures since they
target all employed workers of a specific skill, industry or area. Calmfors (1994), Marx (2001)
and Martin and Grubb (2001) review evaluations for the OECD and summarize that dead-
weight and substitution effects undo between 42 to 93 percent of the direct employment ef-
fect of wage subsidies, with general subsidies at the higher end46. Studies on Sweden put the
value of deadweight, on average, at 60%47, and more recent evidence from Betcherman et al.
(2010) reveals between 27% and 78% of deadweight depening on the design. Neumark (2013)
surveys the evidence from the US and finds deadweight costs between 67% and 96%, and
recent evidence for Germany by Boockmann et al. (2012) shows that deadweight costs
fully absorb positive employment effects. Another recent study by Betcherman et al.
(2010) clearly shows the importance of targeting in this respect: Turkish wage subsidies
were subject to deadweight costs of 27% or 78% depending on design. Marx (2001) reviews
various studies also generating substitution and displacement costs between 20% and 50%.
In addition, these instruments provide incentives to collude and cash in on the
government subsidy, for example, taking up subsidized working hour reductions
when this would be unnecessary to prevent separations.
Wage effects might also significantly weaken wage subsidies’ effectiveness, since
they are exclusively targeted at insiders, who will bargain for a share of the subsidy,
whereby the effectiveness of this policy is weakened. Temporary workers are often
discriminated in work sharing schemes, which also strengthens the position of in-
siders vis-à-vis outsiders and thereby increases labor market segmentation48. Further-
more, these measures make it more difficult for outsiders to enter employment,
which reflects a negative competition effect in the labor market as well as displace-
ment of regular new employment since jobs can be preserved which would not have
been conserved without the program, even after the economic situation recovers.
Thereby, by locking workers in low-productivity jobs and reducing the outflow from
employment, these measures also reduce the outflow from unemployment as well as
outsiders’ employment prospects49. Ultimately, these measures will increase the per-
sistence in the labor market. If these policies are not implemented only for a very lim-
ited period, they will have longer lasting negative effects, that is, increasing structural
and long-term unemployment, and the resulting skill attrition of unemployed workers
as well as workers dropping out of the labor force. An additional longer-term side ef-
fect of the subsidies and also the work sharing schemes—if not combined with train-
ing measures in the hours not worked—is an increase in unemployment-prone labor
market groups due to the disincentives for skill acquisition.
Besides the lowest skilled and productive workers, which are the most likely to be laid
off in a recession, will be those entering the work sharing schemes50, thereby lowering
aggregate productivity. A longer use of these instruments may keep non-competitive
jobs and inhibits efficient labor reallocation51.
Both wage subsidies, in particular, and work sharing schemes imply a significant cost to
the government52. For example, Huttunen et al. (2013) analyzed low-wage subsidies in
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discontinued. On the other hand, the three countries making most extensive use of work
sharing programs, Germany, Italy and Japan, in 2009 spent between 0.1% and 0.3% of
GDP53. Again design is crucial to balance cost-effectiveness and take-up54.
Work sharing schemes have played a prominent role in OECD countries’ policy reac-
tion to the economic crisis—they have been adopted in over three quarter of the OECD
countries55 and involve up to 5 percent of the workforce. Some countries, for example
Germany’s Kurzarbeit and France’s chômage partiel, already had programs in place and
have extended them and eased design features to simulate take-up, while others have
set up new programs56. While, on average, these schemes played an important role in
retaining employment, take-up rates and effectiveness have varied significantly between
countries, which has been attributed to design features and whether schemes were
already in place57.
The work of the OECD (2010) and Boeri and Bruecker (2011) as well as empirical re-
search reviewed by Cahuc and Carcillo (2011) suggest that work sharing schemes in the
OECD significantly reduced the rise in unemployment, but they also confirm substantial
deadweight costs (schemes are used to subsidize working hour reductions that would have
been adopted also in the absence of the scheme) and suggest similar displacement costs58.
Furthermore, Hijzen and Venn (2011) support that in contrast to permanent jobs, tem-
porary jobs have not been saved through work sharing arrangements, which strengthens
market segmentation and insiders’ position. The OECD (2010) also shows that countries
with already existing programs have been more effective in retaining employment than
countries which have set up a new scheme and attribute also the low take up rate in the
latter countries to the time-lag involved in introducing and implementing a new scheme
in the wake of a crisis. Several countries combined the work sharing scheme with partly
subsidized training measures in the hours not worked, which, if not obligatory, was taken
up only by up to 25 percent of the workers involved in the schemes59.
The intensively used German “Kurzarbeit” scheme and its success in keeping un-
employment down have been widely praised and generated interest in the relevance of
these programs as a tool to combat economic crises. According to the OECD (2010)
and Boeri and Bruecker (2011), the German scheme has saved approximately. 400,000
jobs by the third quarter of 200960, and Brenke et al. (2011) point out that unemploy-
ment would have doubled its rate since mid-2009 in the absence of the scheme. Boeri
and Bruecker (2011) highlight only moderate deadweight costs of this scheme, which
the OECD (2010) estimates to be a third of the cost, and suggest this to be a result of
its optimized design features (eligibility and entitlement conditions)61.
Brenke et al. (2011) and the OECD (2010) point out the importance of such schemes
in fitting into the institutional framework and with other labor market policies (for
example, centralization of wage bargaining). Worker and employers in countries
running a flexicurity set of labor market policies, for example, involving low firing costs
and high unemployment benefit replacement rates will have low incentives to take up a
work sharing scheme unless it is heavily financed by the public budget.
Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll (2010) show that the so-called German Job Miracle and
the intensive use of adjusting hours can only to a minor extent be attributed to the
German Kurzarbeit, which is quantified by Fuchs et al. (2010) to a third of working-
time reductions62.
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ive in steep downturns, and also the OECD (2010) attributes a higher effectiveness to
an existing scheme at the onset of the recession. Furthermore, the negative effects of
this measure will be smaller in a deep recession, but can rise dramatically in a
recovery63.
Thus, both authors suggest, that it may be useful, if policy complementarities are
taken into account, to have a small scheme with discouraging eligibility conditions and
generosity to minimize above mentioned negative effects running in normal times.
Such a scheme could then be swiftly scaled up by adapting the requirements and bene-
fits to retain workers in employment in the short-run once temporary severely negative
economic circumstances impact64. To limit negative effects in the presence of closely
binding budget constraints, after a very limited period of time, the scheme should be
tightened back again irrespectively if a recovery takes hold or not65. The OECD (2010)
though points out the lack of empirical evidence to support such a policy stance.
In conclusion, while for the reasons stated above, wage subsidies have proven very
cost-ineffective and undesirable to incentivize the retention of workers. Work sharing
arrangements, if applied for a very limited period of time at the onset of a severe eco-
nomic crisis, may alleviate the impact of the crisis on employment. This measure en-
ables employers to reduce labor costs and at the same time retain skilled and trained
workers and keeps insiders in employment with full or partial conservation of their in-
come. Importantly, these schemes should be combined with training during the hours
not worked to support skills development and combined with measures to significantly
support outsiders. Nonetheless, the longer-run implications also have to be taken into
account, i.e., the risk of increasing labor market persistence and long-term unemploy-
ment by disadvantaging outsiders as well as delaying inevitable labor reallocation,
which might also obstruct recovery.4.2 Incentives for creating employment (Category II)
ALMPs providing incentives for creating employment involve mainly financial incen-
tives, that is, subsidies for employers and also entrepreneurship advisory services to en-
courage employment in the private sector. The scale and applicability of subsidies on
the one hand and entrepreneurship support on the other hand are different; therefore,
we will discuss their effects and evaluations separately.
A wide range of differently targeted and designed wage and hiring subsidies exist
which can increase job matching by incentivizing job search and raise labor demand by
subsidizing employer’s labor costs66.
Betcherman et al. (2004) point out that most evaluations of subsidies do not show
positive impacts on post program employment or earnings. As pointed out in the previous
section, wage subsidies entail huge indirect effects, especially deadweight, substitution
and displacement, making them cost-ineffective and undesirable due to their long-run
implications on skills development67.
To reduce indirect effects via appropriate targeting, the focus should be on hiring un-
employed workers via hiring subsidies, which are more cost-effective68. These measures,
thereby, support labor market outsiders—that is, unemployed, inactive, and informal
workers—and are often targeted at specific subgroups such as long-term-unemployed
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groups of workers irrespectively of whether they are new hires or already employed, hiring
subsidies exclusively redistribute incentives to unemployed workers.
Various reviews of studies around the world (Heckman et al. 1999, Card et al. 2010) fo-
cused on OECD countries (Martin and Grubb 2001), and especially evaluations for
Sweden (Sianesi, 2008; Carling and Richardson, 2004), highlight that private sector hiring
subsidies can generally be more effective in benefiting the targeted workers by bringing
them into employment than public education and training measures or public works69.
For example, evidence on the success of hiring subsidies in Austria is presented by Dauth
et al. (2010), for Australia by Stromback and Dockery (2000), for Poland by O’Leary et al.
(1998), for Slovakia by van Ours (2000), for Gemany by Jirjahn et al. (2009) and Bernhard
et al. (2008a), for Sweden by Sianesi (2004), Carling and Richardson (2004), and Forslund
et al. (2011) as well as for the New Deal for young people in the UK by Bonjour et al.
(2001) and Dorsett (2006). However, design features always strongly affect the impact and
success of hiring subsidies.
Evidence for various countries shows that hiring subsidies outperform other ALMPs
in terms of post program employability70. A survey by Neumark (2013) of US evidence
highlights that, using unfavorable estimates, hiring subsidies are at least more than
twice as effective as public job creation. Bernhard et al. (2008b) analyzed participation
in hiring subsidies for welfare recipients in Germany and provide evidence that ap-
proximately 70 percent of participants gained regular employment, the effect of hiring
subsidies amounted to around 40 percentage points.
Thus, evidence shows that hiring subsidies bring workers into employment, and these
workers are retained, but often these evaluations do not look at longer run effects and
do not take indirect effects into account71. In general, such indirect costs tend to be
much smaller for hiring subsidies.
First, hiring subsidies are paid for a limited period. For this reason, in contrast to
wage subsidies which can prove difficult to phase out72 and are subject to strong
locking-in effects, subsidizing hirings have lower locking-in effects73. The limited dur-
ation feature of this instrument also reduces potential substitution effects and disincen-
tives to acquire human capital in contrast to wage subsidies. As pointed out above, in
contrast to the other mentioned indirect effects, the former effect lacks empirical sup-
port in the literature74.
Second, they cover new hires, thus outsiders, who in contrast to insiders are less pro-
tected by labor turnover costs and thereby, have a weaker bargaining position75. This is
confirmed by Stephan’s (2010) microeconomic evidence for Germany showing that
wages of new workers are not affected by hiring subsidies76. At the same time, by redis-
tributing employment incentives to the disadvantaged outsiders, hiring subsidies in-
crease the competition in the labor market, put downward pressure on wages and,
thereby, indirectly increase employment77.
Third, they generally target disadvantaged workers, e.g., long-term unemployed
workers, which have low probabilities of becoming employed, and furthermore, signifi-
cantly less workers are covered by hiring subsidies, e.g., for the long-term unemployed
relative to low-skill wage subsidies.
Thereby, the resulting deadweight costs can be expected to be smaller – evidence for
Germany by Bernhard et al. (2008b) places it at 20-30%. But again, design is crucial;
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deadweight costs absorb any employment effects. Deadweight costs can be further mini-
mized by tightly targeting workers with the lowest exit rates out of unemployment, but
not completely avoided.
Nonetheless, hiring subsidies might still entail significant displacement costs, capturing
the fact that employment generated by ALMP might displace or crowd our regular em-
ployment; for recent US evidence, see Neumark and Grijalva (2013). Hiring subsidies may
incentivize firms to hire subsidized workers instead of unsubsidized workers, to lay off
workers in order to hire subsidized workers or to lay off subsidized workers once the hir-
ing subsidy expires. This indirect effect also significantly lowers the cost-effectiveness of
programs since it clearly influences the net employment effect. Swedish studies find
sizeable displacement effects for Swedish hiring subsidies of around 65-70%, and studies
for Ireland and the UK 20%, for Belgium 36% and for the Netherlands 50%78.
In order to enhance their cost-effectiveness, hiring subsidies can be targeted at disad-
vantaged workers, for example long-term unemployed workers. As highlighted by Martin
and Grubb (2001) and Neumark (2013), tight targeting can raise net employment impact
by 20–30 percent, but it needs to balance still being attractive for employers to take up as
well to avoiding stigmatization. A study by Fay (1996) on a smallscale British project for
long-term unemployed people concluded that the deadweight loss amounted to no more
than between 15 and 20 percent79. Employers may be asked to reimburse a share of the
subsidy if the worker is dismissed within a certain period, which would also decrease
churning and increase transition effects80. Documentation and reporting requirements
may however create cost-intensive monitoring or bureaucratic procedures, thereby redu-
cing employer take-up81. Recent evidence by Moczal (2013) on German wage subsidies
for hard to place welfare recipients confirms low deadweight costs but also low take-up of
tight targeting. Stigmatization results from too tight targeting of very disadvantaged
workers, since workers participating in the program may then be perceived as signaling
low productivity. Thus, too tight targeting can result in employers refraining from hiring
workers, stigmatizing workers and effectively reducing their future employment. Evidence
for this effect has also been widely documented82.
Displacement effects though may not be that significant. Apart from reducing them
through sensible targeting, displacement could also be tolerated if the transition effect
and also the screening effect are sufficiently large:83
The former refers to the fact that subsidized hirings enables employers to gain infor-
mation on the productivity of workers. Among others, the review by Betcherman et al.
(2004) and especially evaluations from Sweden and Switzerland (Gerfin and Lechner
2002, Kluve et al. 2008 as well as Sianesi 2008, 2001), point to evidence of effective pro-
grams in which employers effectively use subsidized hirings as screening devices as sub-
stitutes to work experience. Based on the gained information on the productivity of
workers, employers may be more willing to retain the worker after the program than
they would have been willing to hire her without the subsidy84.
By bringing unemployed workers into a job, hiring subsidies enable workers to sus-
tain or regain their skills and thereby enhance effective labor supply85. Their previous
low employment probability is exchanged with a higher retention probability, and even
if laid off once the subsidy elapses, workers have higher reemployment probabilities
than previously86. This effect is also highlighted in recent German evidence from
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who got hired into a subsidized job as well as workers who received formal work-
specific training and became immediately employed. This implies that employers value
on the job learning via a subsidized job as much as formal training programs. Also
evidence from Sweden and Switerland (Carling and Richardson, 2004 and Gerfin and
Lechner, 2002) shows that work-specific human capital seems to be clearly valued
by firms. The broad evidence that the closer subsidized employment is to regular
employment the more valuable it is also supports this notion87.
The transition effect will be strongest for long-term unemployed workers who suffer
from skill attrition and loss of work routine. Swiss evidence by Gerfin et al. (2005) high-
lights the stronger effects for the long-term unemployed. Recent evidence from Sjögren
and Vikström (2013) on hiring subsidies targeted at long-term unemployed workers in
Sweden reveals that the subsidy duration positively affects the retention probability.
In contrast to increasing the subsidy rate, increasing durations is irrelevant for job
finding rates, which may indicate, as one can expect, that transition effects need longer
to materialize than screening effects. Further evidence from Slovakia, the UK's New
Deal, from the US's Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and recent evaluations of differ-
ent German labor market programs is presented by Jirjahn et al. (2009) and Bernhard
et al. (2008a and b) on a significant transition effect88.
Hiring subsidies’ cost effectiveness depends on whether they impact workers’ employ-
ment prospects in the longer-run mainly via these effects. To capture the full longer-run
implications of these effects, it is crucial to evaluate their impact on the longer-run devel-
opment of employment careers89. Only recently did empirical research start looking at
longer term effects, e.g., at the relationship between ALMP and job durations90. Longer-
term evaluations provide evidence that short-term rankings of instruments’ effectiveness
can be overturned and, thereby, highlight the need of longer-run evaluations and that
hiring subsidies can indeed be cost-effective. For example, German evidence shows that
20 months after taking up a subsidized job, the probability of being in regular employ-
ment is around 40 percentage points higher. The evidence by Sianesi (2008) for
Sweden reveals that hiring subsidies performed best in cost-effectiveness and led to
higher employment probability of 40 percentage points after the program and 10 per-
centage points after 5 years, averaging to 19 percentage points over 5 years. Also
Calmfors et al. (2001) find that hiring subsidies have a positive impact on future em-
ployability. As discussed, these effects will be stronger for long-term unemployed
workers and should be targeted, as suggested by the evidence of Bernhard et al.
(2008b) and Gerfin et al. (2005).
Hiring subsidies appear cheapest among the Swedish active labor market measures,
and especially those targeting long-term unemployed workers perform best and have
been the cheapest instrument91. Van Ours (2000) reports that hiring subsidies in
Slovakia seem the most efficient active labor market policy. While these studies do only
relate to direct budget effects, Brown et al. (2011) confirm the cost-effectiveness of hir-
ing subsidies in their simulations. The authors show that by bringing long-term
workers back into employment, these hiring subsidies could be self-financing via saved
unemployment benefits payments and additionally generated tax revenue.
In sum, as Martin and Grubb (2001) point out, limited period hiring subsidies to private
employers can indeed be cost-effective and have sizeable macroeconomic employment
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ing subsidies.
To maximize competition, transition and screening effects, hiring subsidies should be
targeted at the losers in the labor market, for example, the long-term unemployed
workers and inactive workers92, and to increase cost-effectiveness, subsidy payments
should continuously increase with unemployment duration93.
Even if the positive employment effects on the one side and significant deadweight
and displacement effects on the other side outweigh each other, implying no increase of
total employment, hiring subsidies may still be desirable94. By redistributing employ-
ment incentives to the disadvantaged, strengthening their attachment to the labor mar-
ket, and thereby reducing long-term unemployment, they increase labor market flows
and reduce labor market persistence and enable a more equitable distribution of un-
employment95. Thereby, hiring subsidies can be a significant countercyclical labor mar-
ket stabilizer in normal times to avoid increases of long-term unemployment and
detachments from the labor market96.
These instruments can perform as countercyclical labor market stabilizers in normal times
to avoid increases of long-term unemployment and detachments from the labor market. Fur-
thermore, As shown by the OECD (2010), various OECD countries in response to the crisis
have adopted hiring subsidies targeted at disadvantaged parts of the workforce as well as re-
ductions of non-wage labor costs for hires. While these instruments might be cost-ineffective
once an economic crisis hits, they are an important device once the recovery is in sight to
support it and incentivize the recruitment of disadvantaged workers97.
Nonetheless, in recessions, the equity aspect might be of relevance to avoid disadvan-
taged workers leaving the labor market and to give them a competitive edge in the
search for jobs. Targeting should be tightened once the recovery accelerates to reduce
costly negative indirect effects98.
This category also encompasses a generally smaller program in size and applicability
of providing incentives for self-employment. Besides the direct objective of supporting
the outflow of unemployment into self-employment, the indirect desired implication of
these programs is that the start-ups create further employment.
While the thin and only microeconometric evidence on such programs is mixed, positive
or insignificant, recent evidence signals more positive impacts. Reviews by Betcherman et al.
(2004), Cazes et al. (2009), Kuddo (2009) and Martin and Grubb (2001) partly indicate posi-
tive effects on employment probability after the program for male, better educated workers
of 30–40 years with particular interest in entrepreneurial activities, but mixed evidence on
future earnings99. Almeida and Galasso (2007) find significant income effects in Argentina
only for young and highly educated individuals. Rodriguez-Planas (2010), evaluating a
Romanian program, shows strong employment effects for low-skilled workers100. Carling and
Gustafson (1999) present evidence of self-employment grants being more effective than
hiring subsidies in Sweden. Advisory services on their own or combined with financial
incentives generally generate better results than only financial incentives101.
Most of the authors point out the usefulness of the instrument, but its restricted ap-
plicability to a small fraction of the unemployed workforce of up to 3 percent. The
studies though usually only evaluate the short-term effects of the program, while as
pointed out previously, it is important to analyze the long-run effects over workers’ em-
ployment history.
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Deadweight effects as well as displacement costs are though likely to be high for this
instrument as well. At the same time, increases in the employability of participants
through transition and indirectly screening effects are also potentially large. Workers
will acquire human capital relevant networks, and their initiative to start up their own
business is a signal to future employers, whereby if they leave self-employment, their
employment probability will be higher than before. Similarly, competition effects will
be strong.
A recent evaluation of two German self-employment subsidies for the unemployed
from Caliendo and Künn (2010) provides new interesting results in this respect103. In
their partial equilibrium analysis, the authors evaluate the longer-run impacts 5 years
after self-employment. Their results show significantly higher income after 5 years and
a 20 percent higher employment probability for participants. Furthermore, in contrast
to the studies above, self-employment subsidies are especially effective for the disadvan-
taged workers in the labor market. The authors explain this finding with the low em-
ployment prospects for the disadvantaged groups, providing them with incentives for
self-employment then has a strong effect (relative to non-participation).
These results strengthen the suitability and desirability of ALMPs providing self-
employment incentives to redistribute incentives to the disadvantaged to move from
unemployment into self-employment and strengthen their labor market attachment, to
promote adaptability to new labor market conditions as well as to support recoveries.
Summing up, in contrast to ALMPs aiming at generating incentives for employment re-
tention, these aiming at employment creation, due to their strong transition, screening
and competition effects, have generally proven to be more cost-effective and suitable to
provide labor market losers with incentives to adapt and work, especially in recoveries.
This targeting, which is desirable from a social perspective, also limits cost-ineffective
deadweight effects.
4.3 Incentives for seeking and keeping a job (Category III)
This category groups measures raising labor supply by directly increasing the return
from employment or by making unemployment more costly. Measures such as making
work pay schemes and public works though do not have the sole objective of increasing
employment but rather often prioritized the aim of redistributing income104. The ultim-
ate employment objective is to mitigate the disincentives to search and work created by
passive labor market policies.
The first set of measures in this category comprises financial transfers in the form
wage subsidies to workers, for example in-work benefits, reductions in social security
contributions, tax credits and other making work pay schemes paid to low-wage
workers or low-income families to raise their income conditional on working. These
measures have been especially pioneered and increasing in size in countries like the
USA (Earned Income Tax Credit - EITC) and the UK (Working Families Tax Credit -
WFTC) and are given credit for positive labor market developments. They have re-
cently entered the debate as acceptable reform instruments compared to tax or benefit
reductions, especially in Continental European Countries, where high tax and social
contribution rates as well as generous unemployment benefits and social assistance
create strong disincentives to work105.
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and generate incentives for specific disadvantaged labor market actors to increase work at
the intensive or extensive margin. The direct effect employment of these measures clearly lies
in raising labor supply and labor force participation, increasing transition into employment
and activating discouraged workers who have left the labor force by generating employment
incentives and thereby, improving income and future employment prospects106.
In addition to being cost-ineffective, low-wage subsidies are detrimental to long-run
skills development107. Specifically, the skill-acquisition and locking-in effects are espe-
cially pronounced with these kind of measures. These financial transfers, especially if
they are permanent, may create disincentives for unskilled workers to move to a better
job and/or enhance their human capital108. Any resulting payoff in wages from better
jobs or training is lower since workers will lose entitlement to (part of) the financial
transfers109. Thus, these measures effectively decrease wage differentials between low-
wage work and high-skilled work. Not only will this effect increase the relative number
of unskilled workers, who are associated with higher unemployment rates, but it will
have significant longer-run effects.
Immervoll and Pearson (2009) highlight that the negative skill-acquisition effect is
also likely to outweigh any positive transition effect, by which the transition into em-
ployment counteracts skill attrition and loss of work routine implications of unemploy-
ment. The reason is that while the former effect is significant, the latter, especially in
the lowest-productivity jobs, might be more limited.
Further disincentives might arise, for example, to reduce working hours or shift from
a full-time to a part-time position in order to receive the transfer110. In this context the
asymmetric information effect could strengthen the influence of these disincentives,
namely, if employers and workers collude to cash in on the transfer, for example, by
falsely claiming lower hourly wages and more working hours111.
As the same instruments targeting the demand side, these are also not cost-effective
in terms of the employment objective – from a poverty alleviation perspective they may
be desirable. But also for the latter, these instruments entail a trade-off between cover-
age and costs, especially in countries with compressed wage distributions, as shown for
Belgium by Marx et al. (2011).
Immervoll and Pearson (2009) point at the countervailing impacts in terms of wage
effects, reinforced by the competition effect112, on the two objectives. Employers will
capture a share of the transfer implying lower wages113. The larger the share is, the
weaker will be the negative effect on employment in the low-skilled sector, but at the
same time, the lower will be the reduction in working poverty.
Analyzing the US Unemployment insurance bonus experiments, Davidson and
Woodbury (1993) estimate that displacement and substitution effects amount to 30–60
percent of the direct employment effect in the target group. A different supply-side dis-
placement aspect has been raised by Lise et al. (2006) for the Canadian Self-Sufficiency
Project (SSP). Specifically, only workers receiving income assistance (paid once un-
employment insurance benefits are exhausted) are entitled to the transfer. This created
implicit disincentives for low-skilled workers not yet covered by income assistance to
look for a job114. The reduced reemployment probability counters the increased job-
finding rate for those in income assistance, thereby cancelling out any employment
effect.
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ous approaches can be found, for example, permanent or transitional transfers for all
or only newly employed low-wage earners or low-income families115. The dual objec-
tives make this issue even more complex as the controversy on individual or family-
based targeting reflects116. While low-wage subsidies are generally individualized
schemes conditioned on individual incomes (like the Canadian SSP or the Belgian
Work Bonus), tax credits (like the EITC or WFTC) depend on family size and are
means-tested on household income.
Family-based tax credits can be effectively targeted at poor working families. They
are particularly effective in achieving both goals, labor market participation and poverty
alleviation, for single workers (according to Brewer et al., 2006, the WFTC increased
labor supply of single mothers by around 5.1 percentage points). Nonetheless, at the
same time, they provide disincentives for married women with working partners117,
since earnings by second earners might lead to a loss of entitlement.
In contrast, on the one hand, low-wage subsidies as an example for individualized
measures not only cover a wider number of workers, thereby, generally – assuming the
same government expenditures – with a lower transfer, they are also less effective in
targeting the poor118. Low-wage workers receiving transfers may not necessarily be at
the bottom of the household income distribution119. On the other hand, while having
smaller effects, low-wage subsidies do not create disincentives to second earners, but
rather improve the employment incentives of both married and single women120.
In the US and UK experiences, the success of tax credit measures is reflected by the
fact that the effect on single mothers outweighs that on second earner couples121. In
contrast, Bargain and Orsini (2006a), who simulated labor supply effects for European
countries, show that the overall participation effect for women is negative for an intro-
duction of the WFTC. The authors argue that the differences in the results are due to a
wider wage dispersion and lower levels of taxation in this group of countries.
Generally, the interactions with the institutional framework and labor market policies
(e.g., minimum wages, unemployment benefits, etc.) are crucial for the effectiveness of
these kind of policies which aim at increasing the pay-off from employment122.
The decisive question to assess the cost-effectiveness of financial transfer to workers
is whether both objectives are relevant. While the literature has shown the effectiveness
in increasing employment and incomes of specific disadvantaged groups, they are
costly. And due to various disincentives, they do not generate any (longer-run) positive
employment effect123. Especially general equilibrium analyses, e.g., by Lise et al. (2006),
have provided evidence for a reversal of the sign of longer-run employment effects and
cost-effectiveness compared to partial equilibrium analyses. However, from the perspec-
tive of reducing inequality and in-work poverty, these instruments are cost-effective re-
distribution policies. This holds as far as these transfers are permanent and if wage or
income distributions are not compressed124.
The literature and evidence though also raises the question whether a single policy
instrument can and should effectively combine redistributive and efficiency aims, since
the instruments discussed here have had advantages mainly in one objective or the
other125. Marx et al. (2011) point to universal child benefits as an efficient policy –
without disincentives – to address redistributive aims. To address the employment
objective, other ALMPs are more cost-effective and a better demand-side policies, for
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low-skilled workers’ employment problem, namely, policies enhancing their human
capital126.
Nonetheless, if applied temporarily in crises within a package of instruments address-
ing also demand-side incentives, financial transfers to unskilled workers can be an ef-
fective redistributive instrument to soften income shortfalls.
The second group of instruments in this category is public works. The original aim
of these measures is similar to the previous category of directly raising labor demand,
indirectly enhancing labor supply by improving employability and by avoiding skill
attrition, indirectly improving labor market matching by signaling of workers’ product-
ivity out of employment and incentivizing workers’ job search efforts127. These original
objectives would place this instrument in the second category, but nowadays, this in-
strument has de facto evolved into a safety net following a clear income support and
poverty reduction objective.
Public works temporarily increase employment, but may also increase unemployment
by providing incentives to discouraged workers to reenter the labor market and increase
their income in public works. A strong locking-in effect is attributed to this instrument128.
To avoid more general displacements effects, namely, crowding out private employment
through public employment129, the principle of creating additional jobs in public work
schemes is focused on low-skilled and labor-intensive publicly useful work130. This feature
though eroded the transition effect on human capital, and furthermore, instead of acting
as a substitute for employment experience in the private sector, these public works be-
came self-targeting (also due their threat effect), attracting unemployed workers with the
lowest employment probabilities and, thus, had a stigmatizing effect131. The role of public
employment as a stabilizer during periods of low labor demand was, thereby, undermined;
temporary public programs beyond short-term participation are ineffective, and participa-
tion may actually lower employment probability132.
The evidence on the ineffectiveness of public works has been widely documented;
see, for example, Betcherman et al. (2004) and Martin and Grubb (2001) for an over-
view or Card et al. (2010), Kluve (2010) and Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2008) for more re-
cent analyses. Furthermore, the lack of usefulness of public works in generating medium- to
longer-run effects is supported by Carling and Richardson (2004) as well as Sianesi
(2008), who conclude in their evaluations that the closer an ALMP is to regular work
the better its effects for the participants. The evidence from Autor and Houseman (2010)
from Detroit’s Work First program cleary underlines the relevance of regular work experi-
ence for employment and earnings. Temporary-help job placements had no positive ef-
fect on employment and earnings. The so-called direct-hire placements increased
workers’ earnings and their employment probability.
This evidence clearly questions public employment creation’s use as an ALMP in
light of its significant budgetary costs133, which is reflected in decreasing use of this in-
strument. Nonetheless, as advantages of public works schemes provision and improve-
ment of basic local infrastructure as well as its role as an income safety-net for the
poor are mentioned134. These might explain the sizeable resources spent in OECD coun-
tries and, especially with respect to the latter, its heavy use in developing countries135.
Public works can act as a temporary safety net during crises in middle income countries
targeting the poor and establishing and offering an incentivized compatible low wage136
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in low income countries, where safety nets are broadly non-existing, public works can
establish a self-targeted safety net. These aims of public works though would place it
rather as a passive labor market policy than active and reflects a blending of active and
passive objectives.
Experiences though have shown that in middle to high income countries, activation
policies in interaction with passive labor market policies may provide a role for public
works by reducing the payoff from being unemployed. In these cases, the receipt of un-
employment benefits or social assistance is conditional on the participation in workfare
schemes. This obligation as part of the rights and duties framework of the unemployed,
has been particularly effective in Denmark’s flexicurtiy set of policies (generous
unemployment support, low firing costs and workfare). The low unemployment rate of
Denmark was attributed to this third feature, especially the introduction of workfare ac-
tivation requirements in tandem with tightening of eligibility for unemployment sup-
port and its duration, which raised job search and work incentives for regular work137.
In their general equilibrium framework, Andersen and Svarer (2008) show that be-
yond the locking-in effect of workfare, workfare also has a threat effect for unemployed
workers not activated, who then raise their search effort in light of potential activation,
and a negative wage effect on the employed, since it lowers the fallback position of
employed workers, which reduces their wage demands, and in turn increases labor de-
mand. Rosholm and Svarer (2008) provide evidence for a strong and significant threat
effect, which reduces unemployment duration by three weeks.
Non-participation in ALMP may be sanctioned by, e.g., reducing unemployment ben-
efits. Sanctions represent another instrument targeted at raising distorted search and
work incentives, which in contrast has no locking-in effects138. Van den Berg et al.
(2004) report significant positive effects of sanctions. Lalive et al. (2005) also show sig-
nificant quantitatively similar threat effects arising from benefit sanctions on the sanc-
tioned and non-sanctioned. Van der Klaauw and van Ours (2010) show that the
outflow from unemployment doubles after sanctions have been imposed139. Calmfors
et al. (2001) though point out that program participation may then represent a means
for benefit churning, and program volumes may explode.
In sum, financial transfers to workers and public works do not exclusively target an
increase of employment but redistribute income to reduce inequality and in-work pov-
erty. The former are cost-ineffective, and, due to various disincentives, they create no
(longer-run) positive employment effects. But under certain conditions, they very well
might be cost-effective redistribution policies. Public works programs resemble more a
fiscal drain and can even have negative effects on the employment probability of partic-
ipants. Its temporary use targeting poor families is justified as means to combat poverty
by providing a safety net. This though raises the question whether public works should
not be considered as rather more passive than active labor market policies.
The combination of public works instruments with activation policies as workfare
has provided positive results, especially due to the significant threat effects. Sanctions
and activation measures in general have been very successful in restoring search and work
incentives from unemployment benefits. Imposing sanctions or activation requirements
through participation in job search assistance, training or measures closer to regular jobs
(along the results from Carling and Richardson, 2004, and Sianesi, 2008) might be a more
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Bargain and Orsini (2006b) argue that efficient activation instruments could have a
greater impact on poverty reduction by bringing workers into employment.4.4 Incentives for human capital enhancement (Category IV)
ALMPs providing incentives for human capital enhancement are widely used and rep-
resent the largest share in governments’ expenditures on ALMPs, and the evaluations
show mixed results. A wide array of training and retraining measures are adopted,
stretching from basic jobs skills to certified specific vocational skills, from targeting dis-
advantaged workers to across-the-board programs as well as from offering public class-
room training to financing on-the-job training140. These measures aiming at increasing
productivity, employability and earnings of workers enhance labor supply by adapting
and increasing workers’ skills and improve job matching by tackling skill mis-
matches141. Boone and van Ours (2004) show theoretically that even if training would
not have any impact on the outflow from unemployment, by generating higher quality
labor market matches, it will reduce the outflow from employment.
Displacement effects, i.e., trained workers are hired and therefore existing employees
are fired, are only likely if the training content would be superior to on-the-job experi-
ence, which should be expected to be the opposite. Reviewed evidence by Calmfors
et al. (2001) confirms that labor market training programs do not create significant dis-
placement effects. They might though entail sizeable deadweight costs if they finance
private training of workers who would have been trained also in absence of this meas-
ure. The high cost of these programs often leads to cream-skimming-effects, and by
chosing unemployed workers with a higher employment probability deadweight effects
are thereby further increased142. As with all ALMPs, targeting plays a crucial role in en-
abling cost-effectiveness, and detailed rules should minimize caseworkers’ leeway.
Training measures involve strong locking-in effects during participation in the train-
ing program; its magnitude is directly related to program duration. Evidence reviewed
by Calmfors et al. (2001) suggests that the reduced employment probability during par-
ticipation may even outweigh the positive treatment effect after participation. Lechner
et al. (2005) argue that this result driven by the locking-in effect is due to the focus on
the short-run effects and that positive effects need one to three years to materialize143.
Their evidence suggests that all training measure increase long-run employability and
earnings.
As previous ALMPs, training measures can act as substitutes for work experience
(screening effect)144. To maximize the screening as well as the transition effect based
on the available evidence, it is important to orientate the training towards current and
future skills needs of employers as well as actively involving employers, provide recog-
nized formal qualifications and especially having the training on-the-job145.
While training measures are expected to increase wages146, evaluations show that
wages are insignificantly affected. This may be a result of shorter-run evaluations or
also be a result of the countervailing competition effect of training, which is expected
to be more enduring by increasing outsiders’ human capital147, and thereby increases
labor market attachment of disadvantaged workers. The evidence reports most favor-
able results for training measures targeted at long-term unemployed workers.
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classroom training148 — for example Kluve (2010) points out that combining classroom
with on-the-job training increases the probability of a positive impact by 30 percent com-
pared with solely classroom training. Lechner et al. (2005) provide results on training
assigned by caseworkers misjudging skills and sectoral demands149. This aspect highlights
the importance of involving employers, focusing at least partly on an on-the-job training
component and providing unemployed workers with the appropriate tools to adapt150.
Reviews by Betcherman et al. (2004), Kuddo (2009) and Martin and Grubb (2001) re-
port that the evidence suggests that tightly targeted training in small size programs for
the unemployed have mostly positive impacts on raising employment probabilities151.
Rodriguez-Planas (2010) confirm positive impacts of training in Romania for workers’
reemployment probabilities. Arellano’s (2010) evaluation of a Spanish program also
suggests a significantly shorter duration of unemployment for trained workers. Kluve’s
(2010) meta study confirms the effectiveness of training measures, but as Sianesi
(2008), he ranks training measures below ALMPs for providing incentives for employ-
ment creation and those improving job matching in terms of effectiveness.
Card et al. (2010), Hotz et al. (2006a, 2006b) as well as Lechner et al. (2005) though
point out that the effectiveness of training programs increases significantly in the
medium to longer run and that shorter term ranking of policy effectiveness can be
overturned, whereby it is crucial to evaluate the long-run implications152.
While being a very costly measure, on-the-job training targeted at long-term un-
employed workers seems to be cost-effective. The evidence suggests targeting long-
term unemployed workers – due to the implied competition, screening and transition
effects – might be very cost-effective in supporting recoveries. Nonetheless, to keep the
long-term unemployed attached to the labor market and upgrade their skills, these
measures might also be relevant in recessions, though with no shorter-term impact.
4.5 Improved labor market matching (Category V)
ALMPs improving labor market matching are widely used in OECD countries and are
considered the most cost-effective ALMPs in increasing job search and matching effi-
ciency153. They can overcome frictional obstacles to employment and alleviate struc-
tural imbalances by improving matches and adapting qualifications to employers’
needs154. Besides incentivizing job search of the unemployed, they can avoid discour-
agement and support labor market attachment. Often measures to improve job match-
ing are combined with various other ALMPs, especially with sanctions, whereby it is
sometimes difficult to distill the effects of this policy alone. Furthermore, evaluations
generally focus on job search assistance, which leaves little to say about the other in-
struments, which are expected to have comparable effects155.
While the wide set of short-term measures increases the outflow out of unemploy-
ment and decreases the duration of unemployment, it also increases the reservation
wage of the workers and may have an upward pressure on wages156. This may be coun-
terbalanced by an increase in labor supply by attracting inactive workers as well as by
competition effects since these measures are mainly targeted at outsiders.
Reviews by Calmfors (1994), Martin and Grubb (2001) and Thomsen (2009) as well
as studies for example by Card et al. (2010), Kastoryano and van der Klaauw (2011)
and Kluve (2010) provide evidence on significant effects of intensified job search
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pecially for long-term unemployed workers157. Rodriguez-Planas (2010) present evi-
dence on an increase of 20 percent in the employment probability due to job search
assistance in Romania, and reviews by Martin and Grubb show an increased probability
of outflow from unemployment between 15 and 30 percent158.
While these effects are achievable very swiftly through ALMPs improving job match-
ing in contrast to other ALMPs, for example, those providing human capital enhance-
ment, their effectiveness is concentrated on the short-run and is not as sustainable159.
Recent evidence from Blasco and Rosholm (2011) though highlights the existence of the
transition effect, whereby improved labor market matching can indeed have longer run
implications on workers’ employment probabilities by bringing them into employment.
Displacement effects may exist but can be expected to be small in comparison with other
ALMPs160. Nonetheless, measures for improving job matching may entail deadweight costs,
if they support workers who would have found a job easily without the support, but this is
rarely measured161. Similarly, cream-skimming effects may worsen the effectiveness due to
caseworkers’ incentives or the involvement of private agencies, which typically target higher-
skilled workers who generally have higher employment probability162. At the same time,
caseworkers may also target discouraged workers with very low employment probabilities
just to prequalify them for the receipt of unemployment benefits (churning effect)163.
Nonetheless, evidence by Wunsch (2013) underlines that job search assistance should
be targeted at unemployed workers with low hiring probabilities, since these are the
ones needing assistance in avoiding becoming long-term unemployed164, and beyond
that at long-term unemployed workers.
Card et al. (2010), Kastoryano and van der Klaauw (2011) and Wunsch (2013) confirm pre-
vious results that ALMPs improving job matching should be applied at the beginning of the
unemployment spell. Locking-in effects of these programs are also expected to be minimal165.
To improve the effectiveness via monitoring of search behavior and the willingness to
work very often, job search assistance is combined with monitoring and sanctions to in-
crease its effectiveness166. This makes it difficult to separate and attribute the positive effects
to improved search and matching efficiency or increased search through threat effects167.
According to theOECD (2010), this category of ALMPs has been scaled up considerably dur-
ing the crisis, but Cazes et al. (2009) and Kuddo (2009) point out that in the onset of a crisis,
when labor demand is very low, improved job matching will not be very effective. Evidence
fromDar and Tzannatos (1999) shows this instrument’s ability to strongly support the recovery
phase after a deep recession, whereby, it can reduce the lagging behind of employment growth.
The literature, thus, shows that ALMPs improving labor market matching are very
cost-effective measures which can have significant short-run effects and should be tar-
geted at workers with low employment probabilities at the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell and at long-term unemployed workers. This targeting minimizes negative
effects, and potential churning incentives can be avoided with sanction mechanisms.
While these ALMPs are essential for the functioning of the labor market, there are
most effective in recoveries.
4.6 Policy overview
Table 2 summarizes the discussed cost-effectiveness, the positive and negative effects
and their usefulness in crisis situations and in the normal business cycle.
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This paper presents a new perspective on how to view active labor market pro-
grams (ALMPs) in light of their primary target. To guide evidence-based policy
making, we explicitly highlight indirect effects of ALMPs. We show that ALMPs
aiming at retaining employment, for example, work sharing schemes, should be
used only for very short periods, specifically during severe recessions, and in com-
bination with measures to accelerate take-up. More cost-effective and desirable are
the ALMPs creating employment, which redistribute incentives to outsiders in the
labor market, whereby their attachment to the labor market is strengthened, the
outflow out of unemployment is supported and labor market persistence is reduced.
These ALMPs are highly effective during recoveries.
In-work benefits and public works are not very cost-efficient in terms of raising
employment, but might be in reducing poverty and inequity. The open question for
future research is whether these types of ALMPs are better than passive policies.
Policies readjusting distorted employment incentives, such as activation and sanc-
tion measures, have proven to provide cost-effective results, especially during nor-
mal times.
While generally evaluations of ALMPs tend to deliver mixed results in the short-
run, recent studies have shown that longer-term evaluations provide evidence on
more positive impacts of policies. ALMPs can be indeed cost-effective from a
longer-term perspective (3 to 10 years), and some of them may even be self-
financing. These results call for a shift towards long-run evaluations, including fol-
lowing workers’ employment trajectory to better ascertain the impact of individual
policies.
The longer-run cost-effectiveness is especially evidenced for training programs,
which long have been regarded as too expensive. They are especially effective the
nearer they are to regular jobs and when targeting disadvantaged outsiders. These
ALMPs can support recoveries but may also be implemented in recessions to
minimize the locking-in effect during recoveries. Finally, ALMPs improving labor
market matching are highly cost-effective and desirable, but are only effective in
the short-run.
Nonetheless, overall it seems that ALMPs can only have modest impacts, but may
even be desirable without any net employment impact. Furthermore, as highlighted,
impact and cost-effectiveness depend on design. Given uncertainty regarding their
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